In line with previous literature this paper finds that strict employment protection legislation has a negative impact on the volume of inward Foreign Direct Investment. Rigid labor markets result in high adjustment and exit costs which deter foreign investments. We also find that the deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is larger for industries with relatively high shares of low-skilled workers employed. Our findings are consistent with the view that governments can support structural change by tightening labor market regulations which especially deters inflows of FDI into low-skill industries. To avoid a drop in high-skill FDI host countries should simultaneously improve other location factors especially relevant for the latter.
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Non-Technical Summary
A flexible labor market with low levels of employment protection is commonly perceived to provide an environment conducive to investment, employment and structural change. Many countries have therefore increased the flexibility of their labour markets during the past decades. An important element in the flexibilization of the labor markets is the degree of employment protection legislation. Employment protection encompasses regulations, either legislated or written in labor contracts that limit the employer's ability to hire or fire workers without delay or cost Frequently, a positive relationship between labor market flexibility, a low degree of employment protection legislation, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) attraction has been proposed. This positive relationship is based on the view that strict employment protection legislation imposes exit costs for firms which -ceteris paribus -hamper inward FDI due to a reduction of an investment's profitability. It is conceivable that higher exit costs due to strict employment protection legislation might be of particular relevance for FDI in industries which are highly mobile and less committed to a particular host location. Such industries, often termed "footloose industries", are especially sensitive to changing comparative advantage or changes in production cost. High exit costs prevent these industries from adjusting to such changes. These industries continuously seek for low labor cost locations and employ a rather large share of low skilled workers. Thus, it is likely that the negative impact of strict employment protection regulations on FDI inter alia depends on an industry's skill intensity. The current study investigates the relationship between employment protection legislation and FDI in a panel of major host countries for inward FDI at the industry level. We add to the existing literature by testing the conditional hypothesis that the impact of strict employment protection legislation on FDI differs across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the workforce. Our prior expectation is that tight employment protection legislation will affect FDI more negatively in mobile industries with a higher share of low-skilled employment due to the greater importance of exit costs.
The sample used in this panel econometric study includes ten manufacturing sectors in 11 host countries for FDI for the period 1995-2005 and controls for a large number of determinants of FDI. In line with previous literature this paper finds that employment protection legislation, especially regulations towards regular employment, has a negative impact on the volume of inward Foreign Direct Investment. Yet, we also find that the deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is predominately given for industries with relatively high shares of low skilled workers employed. This result is consistent with the view that high exit costs due to strict employment protection legislation matters particularly for mobile industries like the textile, food and wood industries which continuously seek for low labor cost locations. INTRODUCTION Jurisdictions try to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by offering favorable location factors distinguishing them from competitor countries. A vast empirical literature exploring the determinants of FDI has emerged (e.g. Fontagné and Mayer 2005 for an overview). The results generally imply that both, market-and cost-factors matter for FDI attraction. Within the group of cost-factors labor-related costs are important. Costs of this type not only comprise directly measureable factors like wage costs (i.e. compensation to employees and social security contributions) but also more indirect costs stemming from the inflexibility of labor markets. Inflexibility of the labor markets creates costs for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), since it might prevent profit maximizing adjustment of the labor force in the shortrun.
Yet, although most FDI studies take wage costs into account, empirical studies exploring the relationship between labor market inflexibility and FDI have emerged only recently (see section 2 for an overview). This empirical literature is in favor of a negative effect of inflexible labor markets on FDI decisions of MNEs. Put differently, a positive relationship between labor market flexibility and FDI attraction is frequently proposed. This positive relationship is based on the view that rigid labor markets impose adjustment and exit cost which -ceteris paribus -hamper inward FDI due to a reduction in an investment"s profitability (see Haaland et al. 2003; Nicoletti et al. 2003 ).
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The mechanisms in which exit costs in form of labor market rigidities affect the location and scale of FDI have been formally modeled by Haaland et al. (2003) based on the assumption of an uncertain environment. Moreover, the studies of Görg (2005) and Dewitt et al. (2009) explore the presence of amplifying effects of a country"s riskiness and investment costs on the FDI impact of rigid labor markets.
However, it is conceivable that the negative impact of high adjustment and exit costs due to rigid labor markets on FDI is amplified by a host location"s low-skill intensity: High adjustment and exit costs in form of rigid labor markets prevent firms from reacting to changes in comparative advantage and location factors. As the supply of low-skilled labor is 1 It has to be stressed that another argument -theoretically established and empirically tested by Dewitt et al. (2009) -relates to domestic anchorage, i.e. the decision whether to engage in FDI. According to this argument, a high domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI (anchoring effect of employment protection legislation). This is, however, not the argument here. We are rather concerned with "pull effects" of lax employment protection legislation due to low adjustment and exit costs.
2 abundant compared to that of high-skilled labor 2 it is likely that FDI into low-skill intensive industries is more sensitive to such changes in comparative advantage or location factors.
Therefore high adjustment and exit costs might be of greater relevance for MNEs undertaking FDI in low-skill industries leading to a larger negative impact of rigid labor markets on FDI into low-skill intensive industries. 3 On the contrary, high-skilled labor is relatively scarce and thus higher search costs imply a lower sensitivity of FDI into high-skill industries to alterations in the locational quality.
Although the inflexibility of the labor market can arise from various labor market institutions we focus in this paper on a country"s employment protection legislation which is the central part of the legal stipulations towards the labor market. 4 Employment protection encompasses regulations, either legislated or written in labor contracts that limit the employer"s ability to hire or fire workers without delay or cost (Pissarides 2001; OECD 2004) .
Labor standards and employment protection legislation in particular are largely in the realm of nation states. Thus, employment protection legislation is an instrument which allows jurisdictions to compete for FDI. Moreover, countries typically differ in their preferences for labor standards. Table 1a shows the level of employment protection legislation in selected OECD / EU countries 5 , based on the overall summary index (version 1) developed by the OECD (see OECD 1999 and . This index captures regulations towards both, regular and temporary employment. The index ranges from zero (very low labor market protection) to 6
(very high labor market protection).
2 Low skilled (untrained) labor is frequently described as a type of a location's "natural asset" -in contrast to more scarce "created assets" like skilled (trained) labor (see e.g. Dunning and Narula 1995) . 3 While in principle, low-skilled labor is employed within certain segments of every industry, it is also possible to differentiate between industries (see Peneder 2007 for a widely used industry classification) and rank them by their skill intensity. Typical examples of low-skill intensive industries are the food, textiles and the wood industries. 4 Besides employment protection legislation the trade union density and coverage, the level of wage bargaining and the taxation of labor income are frequently used to characterize the flexibility of labor markets. 5 The choice of countries and years is dictated by data quality and quantity (see section 3 for additional details).
3 Against this background the current study investigates the relationship between rigid labor markets in form of strict employment protection legislation and FDI in a panel of major host countries for inward FDI-stock at the industry level. We add to the existing literature by testing the conditional hypothesis that the negative impact of strict employment protection legislation on FDI differs across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the workforce. Our prior expectation is that the adverse effect of rigid labor markets on FDI is larger in industries with a higher share of low-skilled employment due to the greater importance of adjustment and exit costs.
In line with previous literature we find that employment protection legislation, especially stipulations towards regular employment, has a negative impact on FDI. However, we also find evidence that the deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is larger for industries with relatively high shares of low-skilled workers employed.
The paper is structured as follows: Related empirical literature is summarized in section II.
Section III. describes the empirical methodology applied and the data used. Section IV.
presents the results and section V. concludes. However, they do not find such an amplifying effect. 
The matrix contains FDI-relevant location factors which vary over countries and over time and includes variables varying over time and over country-industry pairs. The former reflect the economic environment which is the same across all industries, while the latter group of variables reflects specific industry conditions. The former matrix includes different proxies for a host country"s level of employment protection legislation (henceforth ).
The latter matrix contains a variable (henceforth ) signaling the low-skill intensity of a particular industrial sector-country pair. Note, the variables contained in matrices and are specified in logs (to reduce the impact of outliers) and enter in a one-year lagged form (to consider that contemporary FDI reacts to certain information on location factors with a time lag (see Bevan and Estrin 2004) and to account to some degree for endogeneity (see
denotes a matrix of (T -1) time dummies and are (n -1) country-industry-pair-specific fixed effects capturing the impact of time-invariant country, industry and country-industry factors. is the remainder error term.
To test the hypothesis that the effect of strict employment protection legislation on FDI differs across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the workforce we include an interaction term between and in the empirical model. The vector captures this interaction effect.
The use of interaction terms is justified whenever conditional hypotheses are tested (e.g. Brambor et al. 2006 To reduce the possibility of an omitted variable bias and to explore the robustness of our results to inclusion and exclusion of variables we apply a "general-to-specific-approach" starting with the most general model (including all location factors considered), the full model, and testing down until only statistically significant variables remain. Note, that we generally conduct one-sided tests with the alternative hypothesis based on the expected sign of the coefficient (cf. Table 2 ). The significance of coefficients with an a priori ambiguous sign is based on two-sided tests. Standard errors are calculated using a non-parametric bootstrap approach over clusters (country-industry-pairs) and are thus fully robust with respect to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Variables and Data issues i. Dependent variable:
We use the inward FDI-stocks of 10 manufacturing sectors in millions of current Euro as dependent variable. The data is taken from Eurostat"s New Cronos database and the wiiw Database on Foreign Direct Investment (for CEECs).
ii. Variables of main interest a. Interaction between and :
The interaction term is defined as the product of times . Given our prior expectations that tight employment protection legislation will affect FDI more negatively in low-skill intensive industries the coefficient of should be negatively signed.
b. Employment protection legislation:
We proxy the stringency of with the indices developed and discussed in OECD (1999 and . For Slovenia the data are obtained from Leibrecht and Scharler (2009;  Given that a higher level of (that is tighter employment protection regulations) implies higher adjustment and exit costs it should be negatively related with FDI independently of an industry"s skill intensity (i.e a negative direct effect of is expected).
c. Share of low-skilled workers employed:
The share of low-skilled hours in total hours worked, , is used as a proxy for the low- As we include most of these underlying variables in our model is intended to capture FDI effects of an increasing purchasing power in our application (also see Görg   2005 ). Thus, a positively signed coefficient is expected.
Labor costs partly reflect to what extent FDI location decisions are driven by efficiency
considerations. An increase in , ceteris paribus, increases production costs. We therefore expect a negatively signed coefficient. In addition, an increase in should impact positively on FDI, not least via its favorable impact on unit production costs.
The change in the consumer price index, , is used as a proxy for macroeconomic risk as a high inflation rate indicates macroeconomic uncertainty which deters FDI. Yet, as our endogenous variable is measured in nominal terms higher inflation rates might also have a positive impact on the volume of FDI (Buch and Lipponer 2007) . Thus the sign of this variable"s coefficient is ambiguous a priori.
Similarly to a higher level of political risk, , should impact negatively on FDI. Yet, due to the particular definition of the measure of used we expect a positively signed coefficient. The variable is intended to capture legal barriers to inward FDI. Legal barriers to FDI are lower the higher the score of . Thus, we expect a positive sign for this variable.
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The variable is a summary measure for the taxation of FDI proceeds capturing both, the tax burden on a very profitable as well as on a marginal investment. More specifically, the after-tax profit from FDI is directly determined by the average tax rate (see Devereux and Griffith 1998a) . A higher implies lower after-tax profits and thus lower incentives to invest in a particular location. Thus, a negatively signed coefficient is expected.
As an increasing part of FDI constitutes R&D related activities (see e.g. Guimón 2009) a high level of public expenditures on R&D should be relevant for an MNE"s location decision.
Specifically, a country"s R&D level can be considered as a type of public good with positive spill-over effects on firms. These in turn increase productivity without causing additional costs and lead to a higher profitability of an investment. Thus, an increase in the public R&D expenditures in GDP ( ) should have a positive impact on FDI.
A country"s endowment with material infrastructure is generally considered to have a positive impact on FDI. Thereby a favorable endowment with ICT-infrastructure has been frequently shown to be particularly relevant for FDI attraction (e.g. Bellak et al. 2009; Mollick et al. 2006 ). Therefore we include a variable, , capturing a country"s endowment with ICTinfrastructure in the empirical model. However, it should be stressed, that other FDI relevant infrastructure components, like the transport or the power generation infrastructure, are captured to some extent by . Moreover, as these infrastructure components are only slowly evolving over time, they also might be captured by the country-industry-specific fixed effects, , included in our empirical model.
iv. Data Issues
Our sample includes the countries listed in Tables 1a-c Table 4 shows their pairwise correlations. Some correlations are rather pronounced, especially those with which is consistent with the "catch all" character of this variable. We check the sensitivity of the results to this correlation in our estimations by excluding in one specification (see Table 6 , M2). www.oecd.org/employment/protection; for SVN source is Leibrecht and Scharler (2009) Notes: * captures all three proxies for employment protection legislation used in the analysis; ** interaction term of with each of the three indices contained in ; *** positive sign due to measurement 
IV. RESULTS
We start by commenting briefly on the control variables. The remainder of the results section is organized by the three types of . Table 6 (M1 and M4) shows that we control for many different cost-and market-related determinants of FDI. In particular, Table 6 implies that the countries in our sample are host countries of FDI where (i) political and macroeconomic risk does not play a role; where (ii) relevant restrictions on FDI hardly exist anymore and where (iii) FDI are not productivity driven, but primarily labor cost driven. FDI directed to these countries reacts significantly positive to an increase in market size and purchasing power, as well as to an improvement of ICT-infrastructure and significantly negative to an increase in labor costs and taxes. These results are not implausible when compared to related empirical literature on the determinants of FDI (e.g. Bevan and Estrin, 2004 
Control variables
Variables of main interest
Starting with Table 6 suggests that strict employment protection has a direct, not interacted, negative effect on inward FDI-stock (see M1-M3). 11 The size of the coefficient on (M1 -0.48 and similar sizes of coefficients in M2 and M3) implies that a 1% increase in the index of employment protection would lead to an almost 0.5% reduction in inward FDIstocks. These results are consistent with the findings of prior empirical literature (see section 2).
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Before we turn to the interaction effect, a few words on the second variable which constitutes the interaction effect, i.e. , are in order. Referring to Table 6 (M1-M5) 22 consistently carries a negative sign with an elasticity of 0.4-0.5. The negative sign points to the prevalence of horizontal FDI where firms duplicate their domestic activities abroad. This finding is plausible as the host countries included in our sample receive most of inward FDI from countries of similar level of development.
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The interaction effect, , shows a negatively signed coefficient which is also statistically significant. Moreover, the F-test reported in Table 6 As already stressed the marginal effect of cannot be taken directly from the values given in Table 6 Endogeneity is mitigated by using two-years and higher lagged values of these variables as instruments within an Arellano-Bond-type First Difference estimator. Moreover, the appendix to the paper contains a Figure A1 which is similar to Figure 1 but based on model 23 (M5_GMM). Models (M3_GMM) and (M5_GMM) as well as Figure A1 imply that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 15 Thus, taken together our results suggest that a high value of deters FDI in general and in industries with high shares of low-skilled workers employed in particular. Cameron and Trivedi 2009, p. 429f) ; OV = Hansen-J-test on validity of instruments; AR() = Arellano-Bond-test for serial correlation; *** / ** / * = significant (one-sided test) at the 1% / 5% / 10% significance level. As is a summary index it might hide structural differences, which are revealed by the underlying sub-indices, and . Table 7 includes the results.
Again starting with the model excluding the interaction effect (M6 as the preferred model), the coefficient on is statistically significant and also carries a negative sign like
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, but implying a substantially higher elasticity. Thus, strict regulations towards regular employment have a significant direct effect on inward FDI. Table 7 shows the preferred specification with the interaction term included.
Model (M7) in
Although none of the three coefficients of main interest is statistically significant this does not imply that no economically and statistically significant effect exists (cf. Figure 2) as outlined above and detailed in Brambor et al. (2006) . Moreover, and are jointly statistically different from zero.
The marginal effect of evaluated at the mean value of is -1.11. 16 Thus, evaluated at the mean value of the effect of is larger than that of . 
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The third indicator of used in the analysis is . In marked contrast to the previous results, the coefficient on is statistically not significant and has a substantially lower elasticity close to zero. Thus, regulations towards temporary employment seem not to have any impact on FDI. This result is in line with Gross and Ryan (2008) who conclude that although the protection of regular employment exerts a harmful effect on FDI, regulation with respect to temporary employment has a much weaker impact. More importantly, this result is not unexpected as the share of temporary employment in total employment remains below 15% in the countries in our sample (ILO 2008) . Thus, the majority of labor contracts are on a regular basis. 17 This is consistent with the finding of a larger effect of than on FDI. V. CONCLUSIONS Summarizing, for a country"s overall regulations towards employment protection and for regulations towards regular employment the results confirm our expectations: the rigidity of labor markets matters for inward FDI-stock and the deterrent effect is larger in industries with high shares of low-skilled workers employed. Yet, for regulations towards temporary employment no impact on FDI is established. This is, however, not implausible given the arguments in the related empirical literature discussed above and the descriptive evidence presented.
Our findings suggest that governments can support structural change by tightening of labor market regulations. Such policies may lead to a change in the composition of manufacturing activities by deterring FDI into low-skill intensive sectors. Host country governments should simultaneously improve those location factors which are especially relevant for high-skill FDI (e.g. the economy"s R&D intensity which is shown to have a positive impact on FDI). This has the potential to compensate investors into high-skill industries for higher labor-related costs and thus to stabilize the level of FDI into these sectors. Indeed, such policies have been used by several Asian countries (e.g. China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea) in order to climb up the ladder of production and product technologies (see e.g. Asian
Development Bank 2004).
Finally, let us point out two aspects: First, one should bear in mind that the proxies for the degree of employment protection legislation used in this and earlier studies are often based on legal constraints that apply in host countries of FDI. Thus, they may not fully capture the degree of enforcement of employment protection across countries and over time. This is especially relevant in samples of heterogeneous countries as strict enforcement of labor laws needs well functioning labor tribunals. For example, in the CEECs the enforcement of 28 employment protection legislation is weak due to the limited capacities of the courts and labor inspectorates (see Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009 ).
Secondly, as most industries have segments of low-and high-skill activities, the sector view may be too broad (see Snower et al. 2009, p. 142 ) for analyzing the current issue. Yet, it is hoped that once more detailed micro-data become available, future research will be able to address this problem more thoroughly.
